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Abstract  _ 
In a procurement contract the Administration usually has sorne prior information about the quality￿ 
of the bidding firms.  The goal of this article is  to characterize the optimal mechanism in such a￿ 
situation, when firms have private information about their costs. The optimal mechanism selects￿ 
low-quality firms more often than it would be efficient with perfect information. We also compare￿ 
this mechanism with others frequently used by the Spanish Administration such asthe first price￿ 
sealed bid auction and the previous admission auction.￿ 
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In  December 1994  the Spanish Ministry oí Public Works awarded the second íranchise in mobile 
telephone service to the Airtel groupl.  The Airtel bid (85 billion ptas.)  \Vas  4 billion ptas.  lower 
than rival Cometa-SMR's offer.  The Ministry argued that the difference in price was compensated 
by the difference in quality between the two bidders.2 • 
This kind  oí procurement  contract where  bidding firms  are oí different  levels  oí quality is 
awarded by a mechanism we  will in the íol1owing cal1  contesf3.  In  this mechanism the contracting 
board jointly evaluates both price and quality. The goal oí this artic1e is to define the íeatures that 
a  contest should have  to be the optimal mechanism in procurement contract where  the bidding 
firms  have different levels oí quality.  In  others words,  we  want to study how a contracting board 
should jointly evaluate the price and quality . 
The State Contract Law regulates the procurement contract awarded by the Spanish Adminis-
tration.  According to the Law  there are three admissible procurement mechanisms:  the auction, 
the negotiation proceduré and the contest. 
•￿  The auction  ranks  the bids  only  according  to the price  and  the law  recommends  its  use 
whenever possible. 
•￿  The negotiation procedure is  the most subjective oí the three mechanisms:  The Adminis-
tration can award the contract to bids  with the highest prices and even  avoid making the 
decision  publico  Since  the negotiation procedure is  the most manipulable mechanism  , the 
law limits its use to urgent projects, smal1 projects, projects related to the national deíense, 
lEl Pais (December 29,1994) 
2There are many dimensions in this procurement contract:  the technical capacity, comercial strategy, economic 
and finalcial solvency, employment, etc. 
3In Spanish,  concurso. 
4called "adjudicación directa" by the previous law 
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•￿  Finally, the contest mechanism is  used  when  other features  from  the bids along with price 
have to be taken into account. 
The law allows that the use  of both the auction and the contest be restricted, thus they are 
previous  admission mechanisms.  In  this artiele, besides  studying the features of the contest,  we 
analyze  how  the auction and  the previous  admission  auction work, since  these mechanisms are 
frequently used by the Administration. 
As  an important deregulation of the telecommunication sector is going to take place in Spain, 
it seems  also important to study contract procurement mechanism when  the bidding firms  have 
different levels of observable quality.  This process will involve many procurement auctions similar 
to the one mentioned  aboye,  like,  for  example, the one that will  take place for  cable television 
franchises. 
Other important applications inelude the regulation of the electric sector: the last reform of the 
electric sector established that new power stations will be awarded by contest. Although electricity 
is  a homogeneous good, power stations can produce it with different technologies, and the impact 
on the environment need  not be the same.  Thus, in  this kind  of procurement, quality could  be 
measured by the impact of the technology on the environment as  well  as other important feature 
like the availability of power at different times of the day. 
The literature on the relationship between procurement mechanism when goods have different 
qualities is  relatively scarce.  Thiel (1988) studies the design of the optimal auctions when bidding 
firms  can produce goods of different quality at  ~ifferent costs.  To simplify matters Thiel (1988) 
assumes that a previous decision about the price is  made.  With this assumption the problem is 
analogous to designing a unidimensional auction.  Branco (1992) and Che (1993) analyze the design 
of multidimensional auctions in which  the firms  compete in price and quality.  Rogerson  (1990) 
2 investigates the decision-making process of government agencies with respect to procurement and 
its consequences on the quality of the purchased good.  Manelli and Vicent (1994, 1995) seek  the 
optimal mechanism when information on quality is private and there is a direct correlation between 
cost and quaity but quality is  not verifiable in a court oflaw. Cripps and Ireland (1994) consider 
a  model  in  which  quality is  an  unknown  condition in order to approve the project and analyze 
how  three  specific  mechanisms  perform  in  this  situation,  while  not  characterizing the optimal 
mechanism.  Laffont  and  Tirole (1991)  assume  like  the present  paper that firms  have different 
quality levels and no  relationship exists between quality and costo  They first  study the optimum 
auction when the information on quality is public and subsequentIy analyze the problem of collusion 
between the firms and the agent who awards the project when the information on quality is private 
(it is known only to the agent and the firm).  Their result is that in the optimal auction the principal 
(Administration) has to undervalue quality.  Since Laffont and Tirole (1991) consider a very stylized 
situation with two firms  that can only have two different possible cost and two quality levels, this 
paper aims at providing a more general result that will support reliable normative conc1usions. 
McAfee and McMillan (1989) and Branco (1994) study auctions with foreign bidders, but their 
structures and  their results  are related with our problem.  In  their models, firms  have a  public 
feature  -nationality- that either  has  value  per  se  or  is  associated  with  information  about  the 
firm's  technology.  This allows the possibility to design  an auction with favoritism for  foreign  or 
domestic firms.  McAfee and McMillan (1989) show how to discriminate in favor ofthe firm with the 
worst technology can stimulate competition, while Branco (1994) justifies discrimination in favor 
of domestic firms  since  their profits have a positive effect  on  the national welfare (consumption, 
employment, etc.).  In  the present paper the Administration will  use different observable quality 
levels to discriminate among firms.  It will be shown that while it is  natural that firms  with higher 
quality should have  a higher probability to be awarded the contract, the probability with which 
low quality firms will be awarded the contract has very important implications in order to maintain 
3 
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competition. The ultimate goal of the paper is to provide an optimal compromise between quality 
and price. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 the model is introduced. Section 3 analyzes the 
auction and the previous admission auction which are often used.  Section 4 identifies the optimal 
mechanism and discusses its features:  the main result is  that the optimal mechanism urdervalues 
quality,  and  therefore low  quality firms  are  awarded  the contract  more  often  that it would  be 
efficient.  Section 5 concludes the papero 
The Model 
An Administration wants to undertake a single indivisible project (for example, the construction of 
a bridge) that generates social value V(Q), an increasing function of Q, the quality of the project, 
V'(Q) > O.  The welfare function of the Administration is  the difference  between the social value 
of the project and its price,  W  = V(Q) - P.  The Administration is  interested in finding  the 
mechanism that maximizes its expected welfare function. 
Suppose there are N  firms that are capable of undertaking the project and that each firm has an 
observable quality level Qi. The Administration knows the identity of each individual firm and their 
quality levels; let firms  be indexed according to decreasing quality levels, Q1  > Q2  > ... > QN. 
Firm i has private cost  Ci  of completing the project.  The cost  Ci  is  independently distributed 
according to the distribution function F(c) on [c*, c*].  The distribution function F(c)  satisfies the 
monotone hazard rate assumption  fe  [~t~n  > O.  Each firm knows its own cost Ci, the number of 
bidders N, the quality of each firm, and F(c).  The Administration knows the number of bidders N, 
the quality of each firm,  and F(c) but does not know individual costs Ci, Le., there is asymmetric 
information about costs. We will assume that firms are risk neutral, that there is no re/ation between 
the cost  Ci  and the level of quality Qi and that the Administration always wants to undertake the 
4 project as its social value with the lowest quality is larger than the highest cost V(QN) > c... 
Procurement proceeds in three steps.  The Administration first  announces the mechanism that 
it is  going to use;  in the second  stage each firm  submits a bid; final1y  the Administration awards 
the project5• 
3  Auction and Previous Admission Auction 
3.1  Auction 
In a regular auction bids only specify a price.  We  will now  consider first price sealed-bid auctions 
(FPSB)6, where the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract and pays its bid (the contract price 
is  therefore the lowest bid price).  The next Proposition characterizes the bidding equilibrium and 
the expected contract price. 
Proposition 1  In a first price sealed-bid auction (FPSB),  with N  risk neutral firms,  with  private 
cost  Ci  distributed according  to  cumulative distribution function  F( c)  and with  each  firm  knowing 
its cost Ci,  N, and F( c): 
... .  .  f' [1-F(c)]N-1dc 
1.  The  equtlzbrzum  bzd for a firm  of cost Ci  zs  Pi = Ci +  '¡l-F(c.)]N  1 
2.  The  firm with  lowest cost who  wins the  auction. 
3.  The  expected contraet price is P(N) = f::(c+ F(c))N[l- F(c)]N-lf(c)dc. 
Proof: See  McAfee and McMillan(1987) 
5The three stages are caBed in Spanish respective1y,  licitación, puja and adjudicación.￿ 
6With the assumptions oí the model the contract price does not depend on the class oí auction.￿ 
5 Asa consequence the expected contract price is decreasing in the number of firms P'(N) < 0;7 
since aH firms  have the same probability of winning the auction, irrespective of their quality levels, 
the expected  quality of the project is  Qs  = L:f::l Q¡fN which  is  simply  the average of quality 
of aH  firms  participating in  the auction;  finally,  the Administration's expected  welfare is  Ws  = 
L:f::l V(Q¡)/N - P(N). 
3.2  Previous Admission Auction 
The Spanish Administration often uses  the previous admission auction (PAA) to award projects. 
In  PAA's firms  can only take part if they fulfil  sorne  requirements, such  as  solvency, experience, 
etc.  This kind  of requirements  will  be expressed  in  our model  by  a  minimum  quality level  Q. 
The Administration sets a minimum quality level and the firms can take part in the auction only 
if they a  quality level  no  lower  than the preset standard.  The PAA  is  obviously a more general 
mechanism than the FPSB auction, as  the FPSB auction is  a special case of previous admission 
auction in which  the minimum quality requirement does not prevent the entry of any firm (in our 
model Q ~  QN). 
Let N"(Q)  be the number of the firms with a quality level higher that the minimum Q (N"(Q) 
is obviously non-increasing in Q).  The contract price that foHows from Proposition 1 is  P(N"(Q)) 
and the expected quality is  QPA(Q) = L:f:.?') Q¡fN"(Q).  An  increase in  the minimum quality 
requirement to enter the auction implies an expected quality increase but also an increase in the 
expected contract price as a consequence of the lower number of firms participating in the auction. 
¿N·(Q) 
The Administration's expected welfare will be WPA  =i-}.¡.(~(Qi)  - P(N"(Q)). Expected quality 
and price of the PAA  are no lower than those of the FPSB auction, but expected welfare of the 
PAA  with an optimum minimum quality requirement is never lower than the FPSB auction's as the 
1Since the FPSB auction is equivalent in expected terms to a second price sealed bid auction, the expected contract 
price will  be the second lowest  value of cost in  a  sample of size N  from  F(e).  It is  then simple to check that the 
expected contract price is decreasing in the number of firms P'(N) < o. 
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former is  a more general mechanism than the latter (it would be equal if  Q*  ~  QN, and it cannot 
be lower with an optimum minimum quality requirement, Q*). 
The optimum minimum quality is found  as the solution of a simple maximization problem: 
- {L~·(Q) V(Q¡)  - }
Q*  E argmax  t=~*(Q)  - P(N*(Q)) 
The Administration often uses  both PAA  and FPSB auction, although they are not optimum 
mechanisms.  Due explanation stems from  the fact  that the mechanisms are simple to apply and 
they are more difficult to manipulate than the contest thereby avoiding corruption problems8 . 
The Optimal Mechanism 
As  we  said in  the introduction the contest is  a procurement  mechanism that takes into account￿ 
the price as  well  as  other features of the bid that in our model will be summarized by  a quality￿ 
component.  Our objective is to characterize the contest as an optimal mechanism and with this goal￿ 
in mind we  address the problem using the methods developed  by  Myerson (1981) on the optimal￿ 
design of auctions.￿ 
Our problem is similar to Branco (1994).  This paper analyzes how a project is  awarded to one￿ 
of two firms, one of them domestic and the other foreign.  The main feature of the model is that the￿ 
regulator is interested in maximizing the home country expected welfare.  This objective function￿ 
generates an asymmetry between the firms, because if the foreign firm gets the contract, its profit￿ 
is  not relevant for domestic welfare. If  the domestic firm gets the contract, on the other hand, the￿ 
regulator adds to the project's value the domesti.c firm's profit.  A c1ear  relationship between this￿ 
work and our study exists as the domestic firm can be thought of as  a firm of higher quality, which￿ 
if awarded the project will  provide higher value.  In Branco's optimal mechanism,  the regulator￿ 
8See, e.g.  Laffont and Tirole (1991). 
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to share have  the same features, though in  our case  the Administration is  going to discriminate 
according to the quality level of the firms. 
We  design  a  mechanism  with  two variables  {Pi(Ci,Qi),Xi(C,Q)},  Q  and C being  the quality 
and cost vectors, respectively, and Pi  is  the expected payment made to the firm  i;  as is  clear, the 
expected payment is  conditional only on the own cost and quality, while Xi  E [0,1], the probability 
of awarding the project to firm i depends on the whole vector of costs and quality levels.  The type 
of each firm  is  given by its cost and its quality level, but as  the latter is  public information, we 
simplify the notation by omitting it {Pi(Ci,Qi), Xi(C, Q)} = {P¡(C¡),Xi(C)}, 
We are going to use a revelation mechanism in three steps.  First the Administration announces 
the mechanism that it is going to use {pi(Ci),Xi(C)}.  The second step is the bidding stage, in which 
the use  of a  revelation mechanism  ensures  that firms  report  their own  true costs.  Finally,  the 
Administration awards the project and makes payments. 
We  want to find  a revelation mechanism that maximizes the ex-ante welfare of the Adminis-
tration.  Following the revelation principIe (Myerson (1979)), there is  no  loss  of generality if we 
concentrate on revelation mechanisms.  Moreover, we  restrict ourselves to mechanisms that satisfy 
incentive compatibility. This condition in our setting is  the following: 
where, 7r(c',c)  = P¡(c') - C¡X¡(C',C_i).  According to the above condition a revelation mechanism is 
incentive compatible if all firms, no matter what their cost and quality, are willing to report their 
cost truthfully, Le., all firms  maximize their profits by  reporting their true cost .parameter.  The 
mechanism must also satisfy other constraints on the probability of awarding the project, because 
the Administration only awards one project. 
8 N 
LXi::; 1, X¡  ~  O VCi  E [c., c·],  Vi  E N 
i=l 
Finally, we also want to guarantee that all firms taking part in the mechanism get greater or equal 
profits than simply staying out. This restriction is  called the individual rationality constraint. 
E C_¡{1l"(Ci,C)}  ~  O VCi  E [C., c·],  Vi E N 
If a mechanisms satisfies the three conditions above (incentive compatibility, individual ratio-
nality and the constraint on the probabilities) we  call it a feasible  mechanism.  Then our problem 
is to find the feasible mechanism {P¡( Ci), X¡( c)} that maximizes the expected welfare of the Admin-
istration. 
maxp(c),x(c) E [¿:f::l V(Qi)X¡ - ¿:f::l Pi] 
s.t.  EC_¡{1l"(Ci,C)}  ~  O,  VCi  E [c., c·], Vi E N 
EC_¡{1l"(Ci,C)}  ~  Ec_¡{1l"(C',c)},  VCi,C'  E [C., c·],  Vi  E N 
VC¡  E [c., c·],  Vi  E N 
The solution to this problem is  characterized by the following result: 
Proposition 2  The firm  that  wins is  the one whose  cost  and quality level maximize the function 
'l/J(Q,c) = V(Q) - c - ~f~5'  Then  Xi  = 1 if and only if 'l/J(Qi,Ci)  = maXj 'l/J(Qj,Cj).  The  payment 
to  the  winning firm  (contract price)  will  be  the  maximum cost,  with  which  the  winner firm  would 
have obtained the project.  lf  i is the  winner and i· is the second best firm i, 'l/J(Q¡-, Ci-)  ~  'l/J(Qj,  Cj), 
Vj  f:.  i, the  contract price is: 
c.  if 'l/J(Qi,C·)  ~  'l/J(Qi-,Ci-) 
Pi= 
{  cf'!  : 'l/J( Qi, cf'!) =  'l/J(Qi-, Ci-)  if 'l/J(Qi,C·) < 'l/J(Qi-,Ci-) 
9 Proof: See Appendix A. 
As  we  said  at  the beginning of this section,  the optimal mechanism is  similar to Branco's. 
The optimal mechanism is  an auction with favoritism:  even though aH  firms  can take part in the 
procurement  process,  the greater quality of the firm  has,  the higher probability that it will  be 
awarded the contracto  Therefore, the expected quality of the project is  higher when the project is 
awarded by contest than when it is awarded by a FPSB auction. The contest's expected quality is 
an average of participating firms' qualities with weights decreasing with quality: 
N N 
Qc = ¿ OiQi  with  i > j  ~  Oi  ~  Oj  and ¿Oi = 1 
1 1 
The contest's expected price is  higher than the auction's expected price.  This can be better 
understood  thinking that if the Administration did  not  care about quality and  would  only  be 
interested in minimizing the price, then the optimal mechanism is equivalent to a FPSB auction 9. 
The comparison between the contest and the PAA is  ambiguous.  We  know the PAA is  weakly 
dominated by the contest, but we can not say anything about the quality and price.  The problem 
is  that expected price and quality of the PAA depends on the minimum quality Q 10. 
The next proposition summarizes the main features of the optimal mechanism. 
Proposition 3  The  optimal  mechanism  undervalues  the  quality  with  respect  to  what  would  be 
efficíent with perfect information. 
Proof:  Consider  two firms  with  different  levels  of quality Qj  <  Qi, but  the same evaluation 
according to the optimal mechanism 1f;(Qi,Ci)  =  1f;(Qj,Cj).  Using  the monotone hazard rate as-
9Even though the contest's expected price is higher than auction's expected price, sometimes thecontest's price is 
lower than the auction price (e.g., if the winner of the contest  is the lowest quality firm,  the contest's price is lower 
than the auction price). 
lOIf the minimun quality Qis low, the outcome is similar to the auction outcome.  But if the minimun quality Q 
is high, then expected quality and price of the PAA are higher than thecontest. 
10 
----..------------------r----------------------sumption,  te  [~f~n  > 0,  we  can show  that the higher quality firm  provides more welfare  to the 
Administration than the lower  quality one:  V(Qj) - Cj  < V(Q¡) - c¡.  Therefore,  the optimal 
mechanism undervalues quality.D 
In terms of regulation policy this result, the aboye Proposition shows that when the Adminis-
tration makes the rules for evaluating bids in the procurement process, it should assign less weight 
to quality than the optimal weight  with perfect information.  This implies that low  quality firms 
will  win  the contests more often than it would be efficient.  In  brief, the optimal mechanism dis-
criminates in favor of the low quality firms.u  The aboye result provides the same prescriptions as 
the one of Laffont and Tirole (1991).12 
The idea of Proposition 3 is  straightforward:  There is  a trade-off between increasing expected 
quality of the project and limiting the expected profits of high quality firms.  If the optimal mecha-
nism did not undervalue the quality in the bids, it would result in increasing profits of high quality 
firms, because they have more chances ofwinning, and this would lead to an increase in the expected 
price of the project13• 
The State Contract Law  also considers another procurement mechanism:  the previous admis-
11 An other interesting question is:  When is discrimination in favour of a low firm too high? The answer is complexo 
If the social value of quality is  high and the firms  are very  heterogeneus, the discrimination should be low.  But in 
other cases, the discrimination depends on F(c).  Though we can not give a general result for this case, we can give a 
simple but interesting example.  Consider the family of distribution functions F(x) =  xn  on (0,1).  The value function 
of the optimal mechanism is in this case 1/J(Q, c) =V(Q) - c - ~,and  it follows that the discrimination is decreasing 
in n. In this case the relationship between variance and optimal discrimination can be made explicito  When there is 
low variance (low cost uncertainty and low competition's profit) little discrimination should be employed.  It is also 
interesting to notice that discrimination does not depend on the number of biders N. 
12This result,  also goes in the way  of Branco (1992)  who assumes that firms  also choose their quality levels.  His 
result is that the optimal mechanism produces less expected quality than it would be efficient. 
13We  suppose,  however,  that there is no  relationship between a  firm's cost and its quality.  If  on the other hand 
individual firms  had different cost distributions associated  with different quality levels,  F¡(c),  the value function of 
the optimal mechanism would  be 1/J(Q, c) =V(Q¡) - c¡  - ~:f~:5  and this would imply a change of Proposition 3. 
11 5 
sion contesto  This kind of contest can be  necessary, for  example, if for  specific  quality levels the 
Administration is not interested in awarding the project. But with our assumptions (V(QN)  > c*) 
and our definition of the contest, the Administration never wants to limit entry:  if it did so, ex-
pected price would increase and expected welfare would decrease.  The justifications for the use of 
this mechanism could be reducing the transaction cost (to collect information from  the firms  and 
study the bids) and creating a reputation mechanism. 
Reputation mechanisms  become important when  auctions are repeated.  For this reason  the 
Administration can  take into the account  the behavior firms  had in previous projects to' make 
decisions about new ones.  For example, since there are high transaction cost to prepare a complete 
contract for large infrastructure projects, costly confiict situations are likely to arise and a great 
deal of bargaining can be expected to take place between the Administration and firms during the 
realization of a project. In such a situation it could be worthwhile for the Administration to use a 
previous admission mechanism to maintain high profits for the firms and to therefore provide them 
with incentives not to enter in confiict with itself.14 
The conclusion  is  that to limit the competition through  the previous admission mechanism 
could give firms incentives for  "good behavior". 
Implementing the optimal mechanism 
Although it is simple to characterize the optimal mechanism, its practical implementation could be 
complexo  In fact, the regular procurement mechanism used by the Administration in this context, is 
14The Wall Street Journal Europe (March 7,1995)  reports how the German Administration limits competition in 
the Electric Turbine Market.  General Electric complains that the German Electric Turbine Market is dosed, because 
they  have  not  sold  a  turbine since  before  World  War n.  Disputing  a  simple interpretation  in  terms of German 
protectionism, a quoted source daimed that "a German purchaser must think about his long-term relationship with 
the supplier". 
12 
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board evaluates both price and quality of the firmo  The contracting board decision is based on the 
previously stated award's rules, and the awarded firm  receives only its own bid. 
The aim ofthis section is toimplement the optimal mechanism as a first price sealed-bid auction 
with specific award rules in an simplified environment. We only consider two firms, the high-quality 
firm  and the low-quality firmo  The social value of the quality is just the quality V(Q) =Q.  The 
quality of the high-quality firm  is  1 +Ll  and the quality of the low- quality firm is  1.  The cost 
distribution function  is  a  uniform function  on  the [0,1].  The difference  between the two quality 
values, is at most 1, Ll  E (0,1). 
We  look for  a favoritism auction equivalent  to the optimal mechanism.  15  The award rule 
of the optimal mechanism in  this environment is  'l/J(Q, c) = Q - 2c.  We  are indifferent between 
the high-quality firm  and the low-quality firm, when  their cost are:  eh +1 =C¡.  If the difference 
between costs Ch  - CI  is greater than 1, the low-quality firm  will be the awarded firm, otherwise 
the high-quality firm  will be the awarded firmo 
1 
The award finn is the high-quality one 
1>"::  The award finn is the low-quality one 
Cost of high-quality finn 
Cost of low-quality finn 
Relation between  the award firros and the costs firros. 
The application of the auction that we  are implementing is  quite simple.  The firms  submit 
l~We will do this in a similar way to Branco(1994). 
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their bid, bh  and  b¡.  The Administration computes the costs associated with the bids;  and also￿ 
the difference between these costs a =bb"I(Ch) - bb"I(C¡).  Later on, the Administration applies the￿ 
awarding rule.  If  a  is  higher than  ~,  the low-quality firm  will be the awarded firm, otherwise the￿ 
high-quality firm will be the awarded firmo￿ 
The equilibrium bidding function for the high-quality firm is bh ( Ch) =  21::~2cA,  and the bidding￿ 
function  for  the low-quality firm  is  b¡(C¡)  =  max{c¡, ;~:~;t}  16.  We  can  check  that the high-￿
quality bidding function is  greater or equal than the low-quality bidding function  for  every cost￿ 
(1  A)2
The probability that the awarded firm  is  the high-quality one is  ó*  =  1 - ~, then, the￿ 
high-quality firm has a higher probability to be awarded firm  than the low-quality one.  Therefore,￿ 
the expected quality will be:  Qc = (1 - ó*) +ó*(1 + ~).
 
The high-quality bidding function is increasing in  the difference of quality ~, ~ ~  O,  but the￿ 
low-quality bidding function is decreasing in the difference of quality  ~, ~  ~  O.  Moreover, the￿ 
expected quality and the award probability of the high-quality firm , are increasing in the difference￿ 
of quality ~  ~~ ~  O.￿ 
The previous admission auction 
In this section we want to show the functioning of the previous admission auction.  In  the environ-
ment of the previous section we  have only two choices;  we  can not set any requirement, and both￿ 
firms can take part in the auction, or we can exclude to the low-quality firmo￿ 
If  we do not set requirement (or the requirem~nt, the minimum quality level is low Q~  1), the￿ 
previous admission auction is equivalent to the auction. The bidding function of an auction in this￿ 
setup is  ~.  The expected price is  then  Pa  = ~.  The probability that the awarded firm  is  the￿ 
16See appendix B. 
14 
-------------------------,--r--------------------high-quality one is~, and thereíore, the expected quality is Qs = ~+  ~(1+~).  The expected profits 
oí the firms are 7r:  =  7r~  =  ~.  Finally, the Administration's expected welfare is  W =  ~ + ~~. s 
If  we set a requirement preventing the entry oí the low quality firm  1 < Q ~  1 +~,  the Admin-
istration can only award the project to the high-quality one.  In  this setup , the Administration's 
optimal strategy is  to offer a take-Ieave offer to the high-quality firmo  The behavior oí the firm in 
presence oí the offer is simple: ií the project's cost is higher than the offer, the firm reject the offer, 
in  other case, the firm  accept  the offer.  With that firm  behavior, the Administration's expected 
profit is W sa  =ft'''(1 +~ - Psa)dca = Psa (1 +~ - Psa )'  Thereíore, the optimal Administration's 
offer is Psa = lt~.  Given this offer, the expected Administration's profit is W sa =  (1+4~}2.  Final1y, 
the expected profit oí the high-quality firm is  7r:  = (1+8~}2.  a 
The next  step is  to speciíy  when  it  is  better to prevent  the entry oí the low  quality firm 
difference  quality.  The Administration's profit  implies that ií the difference  in  quality between 
firms is  ~ ~  ~'  the optimal Administration's strategy is not to prevent entry, but ií the difference 
in quality between the firms  is  ~  < 73,  the optimal Administration's strategy is to prevent the 
entry oí the low-quality firmo  When  the Administration prevents  the entry,  the expected  price, 
quality and profit oí the high-quality firm rise. 
Now, we can compare the different mechanisms that we have analyzed in terms oí the expected 
welíare oí the Administration. The main conc1usion is that the optimal mechanism is always better, 
and its advantage is higher when the difference in quality is  high. 
15￿ 7 


















O  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9 
Difference  of Quality 
In  the figure,  the optimal mechanism is  the continuous line  (-),  and  the previous  admission￿ 
auction is  the point line (.).￿ 
Concluding remarks 
If firms  competing for  a  procurement contract are not  homogeneous  and have different  leveIs  of￿ 
quality the optimal mechanism is an auction with "favoritism".  The probability of being awarded￿ 
a  project is  higher when  a  firm  has  high quality than when  it has low  quality.  In  the optimal￿ 
mechanism's value function, however, quality is  undervalued.  Thus, while higher quality firms are￿ 
awarded the contract with higher probability, the optimal mechanism discriminates in favor of low￿ 




Proof of Proposition 2: 
We first want to guarantee that the mechanism is incentive compatible. If  the firm's expected profit 
is  'Ir =EC_ i  [P( C', C-i) - CiXi( C', C-i)], the envelope theorem implies that: 
We  want to replace a global incentive compatibility constraint for  a local constraint.  Fol1owing 
Guesnerie  and  Laffont  (1984),  we  must prove that the mechanism  satisfies  the Spence-Mirrlees 
condition tc  (~; /~;)  = -1 and that the probability of awarding is  monotonical1y decreasing in 
cost  8~i EC _  i  [Xi( Ci, C-i)]  :s  O.  We will omit this second condition until the end of the proof. 
The incentive constraint implies that the firm's' profit is  decreasing in Ci,  Thus we must show 
only that the highest  cost  firm  c"  gets positive profit.  Replacing Pi  for  'Ir + XiCi  in  the objective 
function we get: 
N  N N] w  E [t; V(Qi)Xi - t; XiCi  - t; 'lri 
E [t; NV(  Qi)Xi - N]  - t; N  EC_  i  [C' 1.  'lrif(Ci)dci] t; XiCi￿ 
Integrating by parts and using  ~~  =- EC _  i  [Xi( C', C-i)]  we obtain:￿ 
N  N] N  [ c.  ]￿
W  = E [ ~V(Qi)Xi  - ~XiCi  - ~EC_i  ['lriF(c)]~:  +1.  Xi(Ci,C-i)F(Ci)dci  . 
Since  the objective function  is  decreasing in  'lri, 'and the individual rationality condition implies 
'lri(c") = O, the highest cost firm gets Oprofits independent of its quality, and therefore ['lriF( C)]~~  = 
O.  Given this we  can now simplify the objective function aboye.  Multiplying and dividing by the 
density function  f(c), we obtain: 
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........_._._---------¡--------------------N  N  N  F(C')]
W =E  [?= V(Q¡)X¡ - ?= X¡C¡  - ?= X¡  f(c~) 
1=1  1=1  1=1  I 
Defining the value function 7/J(Q,c) as 7/J(Q¡,C¡) =V(Q¡) - Ci  - ~(~:?'  the objective function is: 
W =E [t 7/J(Q¡,C¡)X¡] 
1=1 
and it follows than the Administration must choose the lowest 7/J(Qi, C¡). 
1  if 7/J(Q¡,C¡) =maxj7/J(Qj,Cj)
X¡( C¡, C-¡) = 
{  O  otherwise 
Given this awarding rule and using the monotone hazard rate assumption  tc  [~{~?]  > O,  we  can￿ 
show that the monotonicity condition  8~¡ EC_  i x [¡ (C¡, C-i)]  ~  Ois satisfied.￿ 
We must now define the expected payment. Given p¡ =ll'+C¡X¡ and using ~ = -EC_  i  [X¡(c', c-¡)],we￿ 
obtain:￿ 
c' 
Pi =C¡X¡(C¡, C_¡) +¡  X¡(s, c-i)ds. 
C¡ 
Let i* be the best firm different from i, 7/J(Q¡"  Ci')  ~  7/J(Qj, Cj), Vj  l' i. If  7/J(Q¡', Ci')  ~  7/J(Q¡, C¡) and￿ 
7/J(Qi,C*)  < 7/J(Q¡"Ci'),  we  define  the cost with which firm  i has the same valuation as  i*,  c~
 
7/J(Q¡,c~)  =maxj 7/J(Qj,Cj)  Vj l' i.  Now  using the definition of Xi,  the payment is:￿ 
c*  if  7/J(Qi,C*)  ~  7/J(Q¡"C¡')
p'-
I - {  C~  :  7/J(Q¡, C~)  =  7/J(Q¡"  C¡,)  if  7/J(Q¡, c*) < 7/J(Q¡"  Ci')￿ 
The payment is Oif the firm does not get the contract while if  it does, the payment is equal to the￿ 
maximum cost with which the firm would have b~en  awarded the project.D￿ 
Appendix B￿ 
The goal of this appendix is characterize the equilibrium bids of the first sealed bid auctions￿ 
equivalent to the optimal mechanism.￿ 
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..._._-----_._--------¡--------------------_. The bid of the high-quality firm is  found as the solution of this simple maximization problem: 
The first order condition is: 
The solution of this differential equation with the initial condition b(1) = 1, is: 
The problem of the low-quality firm is the same. Thus, the bid of the low-quality firm is found 
as the solution of this maximization problem: 
The first order condition is: 
The solution of this differential equation with the initial condition b(l) = 1, is: 
This bid is  wrong if Cb  > 1 - ~'  because the firm can not win the auction, and with this bid, 
the firm  will not get positive profits.  We  must guarantee that the low quality firm  do not obtain 
negative profits.  Taking this into account, the bid is: 
19 o 
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